Beijing’s Iron Fist

With a minute of silence and two months late, the lianghui began, literally the “two sessions.” This is the most important political appointment in the People’s Republic of China: almost five thousand government representatives arrive from all over China to “discuss” and ratify the budget and laws for the next year. The assembly takes place every March, but was postponed this year due to the pandemic. The members of the National People’s Congress, the body that comes closest to our Parliament, are all wearing masks. Only those in the first row have their faces uncovered. That is where the seven members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo sit, along with Wang Qishan, Vice President and Xi Jinping’s right-hand man. In the red and gold setting of the large hall of the people, the image broadcasted simultaneously on all channels speaks for itself: “We have won the war against the virus; our leadership is strong.” But in reality, nothing will be the same as before.

For the first time in thirty years, the Communist Party has not set a target for growth, despite the fact that this is a particularly important year. In the political narrative of the most populous state in the world, 2020 was the year in which poverty was to be definitively defeated, to arrive at a “moderately prosperous society;” the last stage before the realization of the “Chinese dream,” to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the People’s Republic in 2049 as a global power.

Growth of +5.5 was sufficient, but what came was the total stoppage of productive and commercial activities that caused a disastrous collapse: -6.8 percent in the first quarter of 2020. “We have to deal with some factors that are difficult to predict,” explained the Prime Minister Li Keqiang in opening the proceedings, the person who once said that “GDP figures are a human product, and as such, unreliable.”

The picture painted by state propaganda is that of a situation without precedent, from which Beijing has already emerged, though, confirming its strength and speed of recovery. Yet the economic challenges and international situation are “hostile and complicated,” as never before in the past thirty years. And it is immediately clear that the Party leadership has chosen to face them with an iron fist.

There is a request to strengthen “the political responsibility” of Hong Kong, an “inalienable part of the country,” without referring to “One country, two systems,” the formula that guarantees the former British colony a certain level of autonomy until 2047. Taiwan is mentioned without reference to the “One China principle,” the illogical agreement under which Beijing formally considers the island a “rebellious province,” while Taipei continues to think of the mainland as “a territory of the Chinese Republic outside of the area of Taiwan.”

Chinese politics are complex, and follow paths unknown to the majority of the population and observers around the world. This is why it is often explained as “reading the tea leaves.” But this time speculation lasted less than expected. The first news item is that Beijing is preparing to approve a national security law that prohibits “subversive and secessionist activities, foreign interference and terrorism,” without passing through the mini-parliament in Hong Kong, and without considering its mini-constitution.

This is an enormous provocation for the former British colony that for almost a year has seen demonstrations to defend its identity, successfully obtaining the withdrawal of the law that would have allowed locals to be extradited to China. Yet there is clearly more. The future of the city and the recognition of Taiwan are by now an important part of the increasingly harsh clash that began with the Trump Administration. And these are themes which easily allow for stirring up the most boorish forms of patriotism, which in times of economic uncertainty may be needed.

While the government declares that the unemployment rate will rise by only half a point compared to last year, reaching 6 percent, we know that it refers only to the urban population, and does not take into account the tens of millions of migrant workers who lost their jobs during the lockdown. These are the people who leave the rural areas of China to seek their fortune in the cities: an army of laborers, waiters, delivery workers and people who perform odd jobs, that are not counted in the statistics and do not benefit from any form of social protection.

As always in China, the numbers are enormous. The most reliable statistics speak of unemployment over 20 percent, but the situation could be even more complicated. It is calculated that approximately 200 million jobs in China are linked to exports. Now, while China succeeded in resuming production in record time after the epidemic, it did so at a time when the rest of the world had stopped buying. And there are also the direct effects of the trade war with the United States. If production collapses, one-third of the workers employed, the equivalent of the entire Italian population, would not find another job.

The national and international situation is certainly a worry for the world’s second largest economy. “It is necessary to explore new ways to prepare for war,” stated the president of the People’s Liberation Army. Indeed, Chinese generals can’t complain: despite the crisis, the military budget for this year will be increased by 6.6 percent, reaching the level of 178 billion dollars, according to official data. It should be noted, though, that the International Institute for Strategic Studies of London assesses that it is always necessary to add another one-third to Chinese military budgets, represented by undeclared spending. What’s important, as the Commander in Chief Xi Jinping appears to have stressed, is that “every cent is well spent.”